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Short Sales Constraint, Information Content, and SEO Pricing 
 
Abstract 
This article empirically examines the influence of the SEC’s Rule 105, Regulation M, on informed 
trading and the information content of stock prices surrounding the offer day of a seasoned equity offering 
(SEO). The results of this study show that the constraints on short sales imposed by the Rule inhibit 
informed trading and hamper the incorporation of information into the stock price for offers with private 
adverse information and without listings on the options market. These constraints contribute to a 
substantial increase in price uncertainty and a relatively more sensitive response by the market to 
seller-initiated trading. After controlling for other potential causes of SEO discounts, such as price 
pressure and rent expropriation, our results show that the decrease in information content of stock prices 
just before an offer day have a significant impact on the value discount of an SEO. Rule 105’s restrictions 
on informed trading appear to cause overpricing of those stocks for which traders have access to private 
adverse information, thus increasing the pressure to sell on the offer day. 
 
 
Key words: short sales constraint; information content of stock prices; seasoned equity offering (SEO); 
SEC Rule 105. 
JEL Classification: G18; G14 
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Short Sales Constraint, Information Content, and SEO Pricing 
 
1. Introduction 
There was a dramatic increase in the size of seasoned equity offering (SEO) discounts during the 
1990s. For example, Corwin (2003) reports an average discount of 1.15% for seasoned equity offers from 
1980 to 1989 and an average discount of 2.92% from 1990 to 1998. While the discount for SEOs seems to 
be smaller than the discount for initial public offerings (IPOs), it is still a large issuing cost for offering 
firms. Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) document that in the 1990s the issuing expense attributable to 
discounting was more than $2.6 billion, which is more than 50% of the underwriting fees paid to 
investment bankers.  
Many studies (e.g., Corwin 2003; Kim and Shin 2004) attempt to explain the substantial increase 
in SEO discounts in the 1990s. They suggest that the adoption of SEC Rule 10b-21 was one of the main 
reasons for the large SEO discounts. Rule 10b-21, adopted by the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD) on August 25, 1988, prohibited short sellers from covering their short positions 
established after the filing of registration statements or Form 1-A with securities purchased from an 
underwriter, broker, or dealer participating in the offering. NASD was concerned that investors would use 
prepricing short sales to drive the stock price down and obtain new issued shares at artificially low offer 
prices. Rule 10b-21 was designed to prevent manipulative short sales that could cause the market to 
function as an independent pricing mechanism and erode the integrity of the offer price. However, Gerard 
and Nanda (1993) argue that the adoption of Rule 10b-21 not only prevented manipulative conduct, but it 
also restricted informationally-motivated sales. According to Kim and Shin (2004), the implementation of 
Rule 10b-21 saw a substantial increase in SEO discounts. They claim that Rule 10b-21 reduced the 
information content of trading before equity offerings and increased uncertainty, and they conclude that 
the larger discounts in the 1990s were the result of Rule 10b-21. Corwin (2003) finds that the time-series 
increase in SEO discounts can be partially explained by Rule 10b-21’s restriction on short sales. Altinkilic 
and Hansen (2003) suggest that this surprising increase may be due to higher offer frequency and 
contracting competition in the 1990s or to the adverse effects of Rule 10b-21. 
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In order to create an exception for transactions that are unlikely to have a market impact, in March 
1997, the SEC adopted Rule 105, Regulation M, to replace Rule 10b-21. Like Rule 10b-21, Rule 105 
prohibits short positions established during the restricted period from being covered with securities 
obtained from an underwriter, broker, or dealer who is participating in an offering. However, Rule 105 
only restricts short sales made five trading days before the offering’s pricing rather than the potentially 
much longer restricted period of Rule 10b-21, which commenced with the filing of the registration 
statement, Form 1-A. Rule 105 shortens the restricted period because some short sales are motivated by a 
short seller’s evaluation of the stock’s future performance, which can contribute to pricing efficiency and 
should be treated differently from manipulative conduct. The SEC instituted Rule 105 to increase the 
information content of market prices, decrease uncertainty about stock value, and reduce the cost to 
issuers. This article examines whether Rule 105 effectively regulates manipulative conduct without 
causing adverse effects on non-manipulative trading. 
The present study analyzes the effects of short sales constraints imposed by Rule 105 on informed 
trading and information content of stock price from three fronts. First, the daily change in price 
uncertainty is observed during the restricted period. The measures of effects of short sales constraints on 
information content of stock price employed in this study are the change in intraday volatility, estimated 
using 5-minute returns, and the standardized unexpected trading volume, which is used as a proxy for 
investors’ opinion divergence. Many studies (e.g., Altinkilic and Hansen 2003; Kim and Shin 2004) use 
the volatility of daily returns as a measure of price uncertainty; however, volatility of daily returns, which 
is generally defined as the standard deviation of daily close-to-close returns over the 30 trading days 
ending 11 days before an offer, reflects historical information and may be affected by the fluctuation in the 
whole market. In fact, informed trading before an issue can alter the information asymmetry between 
issuers and investors. Gerard and Nanda (1993) suggest that an informed short sale before an offering can 
increase the information content in the stock price. Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) claim that even when 
short selling is restricted investors still can react to negative information through the options market. 
Therefore, volatility calculated with historical prices is not a good proxy for a current information 
environment. Compared to volatility calculated from historical daily returns, intraday volatility is more 
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useful for estimating time-varying volatility. It can capture day-to-day changes in price uncertainty during 
the restricted period, which is the focus of the present study. In addition, Fleming et al. (2003) show that 
intraday-return-based volatility plays a more important role in determining investing strategies. They 
evaluate the advantages of intraday volatility in the context of investment and find that volatility timing at 
the daily level outperforms volatility timing over a long horizon. Therefore, it is reasonable to choose 
intraday volatility as one of the measures of price uncertainty. Furthermore, due to the existence of 
constraints on short sales, unfavorable information cannot be incorporated into stock price immediately. 
Therefore, it becomes more and more difficult for investors to interpret the trading activities observed in 
the stock market and estimate the true value of stock prices, which will lead to greater divergence in 
investors’ opinion. In this paper, we apply Garfinkel and Sokobin’s (2006) method of using the 
standardized unexpected trading volume to measure the extent of investors’ opinion divergence. 
Second, the asymmetry of market makers’ price sensitivity to the order flow of different trading 
directions (buy-initiated versus sell initiated orders) is examined to discover if an increase in uncertainty 
during restricted period is the result of short sales constraints. According to Kyle (1985), market-markers 
should be more price-sensitive to order flow from expected informed trading volume. Following Chae 
(2005), we measure price sensitivity by regressing the change of transaction prices on signed trading 
volume. Rule 105 should only limit the behavior of short selling and restrict the incorporation of 
unfavorable information into stock prices. Therefore, as time goes by, the potential of seller-initiated 
informed trading increases. The cumulative effects of constraints on informed trading based on 
unfavorable information cause market makers to become more sensitive to seller-initiated trading than to 
buyer-initiated trading.  
Third, using the three-tiered approach suggested by Lee and Radhakrishna (2000), possible 
informed transactions and liquidity transactions are identified, and the change in informed transactions 
and liquidity transactions is analyzed during the restricted period. Consistent with the predicted effects of 
short sales constraints, stocks that are not susceptible to these constraints experience larger increases in the 
number of informed transactions and smaller increases in the number of liquidity transactions.  
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The results of our study show that price uncertainty increases significantly during the restricted 
period for stocks susceptible to short sales constraints, especially on the trading day immediately before 
pricing, whereas an increase in price uncertainty is not obvious for stocks that are not susceptible to these 
constraints. These findings are consistent with the prediction that short sales constraints result in the 
decrease in information content of stock price and thus the increase in price uncertainty. 
The results also show that, during the restricted period, market makers’ asymmetric response to 
seller-initiated trading for stocks susceptible to short sales constraints becomes more apparent, whereas the 
asymmetry of market makers’ price sensitivity hardly changes for stocks that are not susceptible to short 
sales constraints. These findings support the view that the flow of unfavorable information is inhibited by 
short sales constraints. We further examine the relationship between the cumulative effect of short sales 
constraints on the information content of stock price and the extent of SEO discounts. We find that, after 
controlling for other factors that may affect SEO pricing, such as price pressure, rounding of stock prices, 
and rent expropriation, the reduction in the information content of stock prices stemming from the short 
sales constraint is a main determinant of SEO discounts. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: In section 2, theories concerning the 
discounting of new offers are summarized, and testable hypotheses related to SEO discounting are 
developed; section 3 describes the sample data and summary statistics; section 4 discusses the influence of 
short sales constraints on information content of stock price; section 5 describes the tests of hypotheses 
related to SEO discounting; in section 6, the adjustment of stock price on the offer day is analyzed; and 
section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Uncertainty and Asymmetric Information 
Most theories about the underpricing of IPOs are based on the assumption of asymmetric 
information between equity issuers, investment bankers, and outside investors. On the one hand, if issuers 
are better informed than investors, then rational investors will be concerned about the so-called lemons 
problem: that is, it might not be possible to distinguish between good and bad firms, and only low-quality 
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issuers will offer the market’s average price. Therefore, good issuers will discount their offer price to 
signal their quality and recoup this discount in subsequent equity issues, dividend announcements, or 
analyst coverage (Allen and Faulhaber 1989; Chemmanur 1993; Welch 1989). On the other hand, if some 
investors have better knowledge about the price that the market can bear, then the issuer faces a placement 
problem.  
Rock (1986) presents a model in which a group of investors have better information than the firm 
and other investors. He shows that if new shares are priced at their expected value these informed 
investors will drive out other investors when IPOs are good and withdraw from the market when IPOs are 
bad. Therefore, issuers have to place their IPOs at a discount in order for the shares to be purchased by 
uninformed investors. This argument has been dubbed the “winner’s curse.” Welch (1992) proposes an 
alternative explanation for IPO underpricing based on the assumption of better-informed investors. In his 
information cascade model, when IPO shares are sold sequentially, potential future investors can learn 
from the purchasing decisions of earlier investors, who presumably are more informed about the equity’s 
value. This behavior, however, can rapidly lead to cascades in which investors will gradually ignore their 
private information and imitate earlier investors. As a result, offerings succeed or fail very soon, and 
issuers always underprice to avoid failure. 
Because of the periodic earnings announcements made by companies and purchase 
recommendations released by financial analysts, the information asymmetry of SEOs is not as large as the 
information asymmetry of IPOs, but the uncertainty about stock prices still exists. Therefore, the study 
discussed in this article examines whether or not firms with high information asymmetry and uncertainty 
about a stock’s value will have a larger SEO discount. 
 
2.2 Constraints on Informed Trading 
Research shows that the implementation of Rule 10b-21 increased issuing costs. For example, 
Gerard and Nanda (1993) claim that the limits on short sales prior to a new offer inhibit the release of new 
information and increase stock price uncertainty. In order to compensate for the additional risk absorbed 
by buyers of new shares, underwriters have to discount their offer price. Kim and Shin (2004) and Corwin 
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(2003) show that SEO discounts increased substantially after the enforcement of Rule 10b-21. Although 
Rule 105 shortens the restricted period to five trading days, the possibility remains that non-manipulative 
transactions will be adversely affected by the restriction. In this article, the change in the uncertainty of 
stock value around an offer day is examined to determine whether the substantial increase in discounts 
during the trading days immediately before an offer day is due, in fact, to the unintended effect of the 
restrictions on informational short sales. The decrease in information content stock price on the pricing of 
SEOs is also estimated in this article. 
 
2.3 Alternative Explanations of SEO Discounting 
2.3.1 Permanent versus Transitory Price Pressure 
Research that examines the effects of price pressure has produced mixed results. For example, 
Corwin (2003) reports a positive and significant relation between the relative offer size and the extent of 
discounting. However, the multivariate models of Kim and Shin (2004) show that the coefficient of the 
relative offer size is positive but not significant at the 1% level. Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) find that 
larger offers have lower discounts, whereas a larger relative offer size (i.e., the number of new shares 
issued divided by the number of shares already outstanding) has a larger discount.  
The theories of price pressure also vary. Some researchers (e.g., Mikkelson and Partch, 1985; 
Scholes, 1972) maintain that price pressure is temporary, and investors should be compensated for 
absorbing this temporary pressure. Other researchers (e.g., Asquith and Mullins, 1986) argue that price 
pressure leads to a permanent increase in supply and a corresponding permanent reduction in stock price. 
If the market is efficient, the downside price adjustment should be completed immediately after the 
announcement of the new offer. In other words, the closing stock price prior to an offer should have 
already incorporated the price pressure of a new offer and, therefore, it is not necessary for underwriters to 
artificially discount the offer price. In this present study, underwriters’ response to an increased supply of 
shares is estimated to determine whether price pressure is permanent or transitory. 
 
2.3.2 Pricing at Closing Bid and Rounding of Closing Price 
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Research shows that sometimes SEOs are priced at the closing bid quote or at integers. For 
example, Corwin (2003) reports that 24.36% of new offers on the NYSE are priced at the closing bid 
quote. Mola and Loughran (2004) and Bradley et al. (2004) note that offer prices of both SEOs and IPOs 
cluster at integers. We examine whether the value discounts of SEOs are simply due to these two pricing 
practices.  
 
2.3.3 Rent Expropriation 
Loughran and Ritter (2002) point out that lead underwriters tend to exploit the gains of issuers by 
underpricing for those investors who are more likely to repay the bank through future reciprocal deals. 
Affleck-Graves et al. (1994) suggest that, if this hypothesis is true, then discounts will be higher when 
more good news is released about the firm, regardless of whether the news is private or public. Therefore, 
it was assumed that there was a positive relation between the positive cumulative abnormal returns over 
the five trading days immediately before the SEO and the extent of discounting.  
 
3. Data  
3.1 Data Selection 
The sample of SEO firms used in the present study were obtained from the Securities Data 
Company (SDC) database, which provides the offer date, gross proceeds, offer price, shares issued, and 
number of shares outstanding. The sample consists of 201 new equity issues on the NYSE from March 
1998 to September 2002, excluding IPOs. The following criteria were used to screen the data. First, to be 
included in the sample, the issues had to be ordinary common shares and could not be a unit offering, shelf 
offering, closed-end fund, real estate investment trust (REIT), or American Depository Receipt (ADR). 
Second, firms with offer prices smaller than $1.00 were not included in this study. Third, firms that are not 
indeed in NYSE’s Trade and Quote (TAQ) database or the (CRSP) database were not included in this 
study. 
As noted by Lease et al. (1991) and Corwin (2003), some firms announce new offer prices after 
the market closes, and the effective offer date should be the next trading day of the SDC offer date. 
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Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) document that on an offer day trading volume increases sharply. Therefore, 
the effective offer date is identified by using a volume-based adjustment method. Specifically, if the 
trading volume on the day following the SDC offer date is more than twice the volume of the SDC offer 
date and more than twice the average daily trading volume over the 250 days prior to the offer date, the 
day following the SDC offer date is considered the effective offer date. 
Intraday data were collected from the NYSE TAQ database. Raw transactions data, however, may 
contain some problems, such as misordered time series and the existence of data outside regular trading 
hours. Therefore, time series data are reordered and observations that lie outside the trading interval, 
between 9:30 am and 16:00 pm Eastern Standard Time, are not included in the present study. Market 
information, such as stock prices, returns, market index, and shares outstanding, was obtained from the 
CRSP database. 
In order to identify whether a stock is listed on the options market, the database of monthly 
options trading volume was downloaded from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) website.1
 
 If 
there was no record of options trading during the issuing month, this stock was identified as one with no 
listing on the options market. 
3.2 Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
3.2.1  Measure of SEO Discount 
Following Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) and Corwin (2003), the discount of seasoned equity 
offerings is defined as follows: 
1
1
−
− −=
P
PP
DISCOUNT offer                           (1) 
where Pt-1 is the closing transaction on the day immediately prior to the offer day, i.e., day -1, and Poffer is 
the offer price. 
Summary statistics for the sample SEOs are provided in Table 1.  
<Insert Table 1 here> 
                                                        
1http://www.cboe.com/data/AvgDailyVolArchive.aspx  
  11 
The average discount across the full sample is approximately 2.08%, which is lower than the 
average discounts in the 1990s but higher than the average discounts in the 1980s. This suggests that, 
although the adverse effect under Rule 105 is less severe than the adverse effect under Rule 10b-21, it is 
still present under the new rule. Of the 201 SEOs included in the sample, 81% are priced below the 
closing transaction price at day -1, and 8.5% are priced at the closing price. The remaining 10% are priced 
above the closing price.  
 
3.2.2  Measures of Reduction in Information Content of Stock Price 
The first variable used to measure the increase in price uncertainty due to a reduction in 
information content of stock price is the change in intraday volatility prior to an offer relative to a 
benchmark period, ΔVOLt, which is calculated as follows:  
1−=∆
Benchmark
t
t VOL
VOL
VOL            (2) 
where VOLBenchmark is the intraday volatility during the benchmark period measured by the median of VOL 
from day -30 to -11. Following Andersen et al. (2001), intraday volatility, VOLt, is calculated as the square 
root of the total of sum of the squared 5-minute returns. That is, 
∑
=
=
tN
j
jtt rVOL
1
2
,*100
                             (3)
 
where Nt is the number of 5-minute-intervals in day t, jtr ,  is the return in the j
th interval, which is 
calculated as the difference of the logarithm of the last transaction price of the jth interval and the 
logarithm of the last transaction price of the (j-1)-th interval. The summary statistics listed in Table 1 
shows that 69% of the issuing firms experience an increase in price uncertainty over the two trading days 
immediately prior to an offer. 
Another variable used to measure the effects of short sales constraints on information content of 
stock prices is standardized unexpected trading volume (SUV), which is calculated using a methodology 
that is similar to the market model approach. 
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itititit RRVolume εββα +++=
−+ ||ˆ||ˆˆ 21 , where t = –120, …, –11           (4) 
−+ −−−= ||ˆ||ˆˆ 21 itititit RRVolumeUVolume ββα , where t=-5,…,5          (5) 
ititit SUVolumeSUV /=                               (6) 
where itVolume  is the number of shares traded in stock i on day t. 
+|| itR and 
−|| itR denote the 
absolute value of positive daily return and absolute value of negative daily return for stock i on day t, 
respectively. itS  is the standard deviation of itε  in model (4).  
Garfinkel and Sokobin (2006) suggest that trading volume arises from three effects: Liquidity 
effects, informedness effects (the extent to which some investors are more informed), and consensus 
effects (the extent of agreement among investors). They assume that trading volume arising from 
informedness effects are related to price moves, and that trading volume from liquidity and consensus 
effects are uncorrelated with price moves. Therefore, the intercept estimated in equation (4) represents the 
trading volume due to liquidity effects and 1βˆ and 2βˆ capture the informedness effects. The 
unanticipated trading volume can be attributed to opinion divergence. Table 1 shows that, over the two 
trading days prior to an offer, about 83% of issuing firms experience a positive unexpected trading volume 
that is led by divergence in investors’ opinions. 
 
3.2.3  Type of Information 
In order to differentiate the type of private information held by informed traders prior to SEO 
pricing, we calculate the pre-pricing abnormal return, defined as the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
over five trading days immediately before pricing, using the market model: 
mtit RR βα ˆˆ += , where t = –120, …, –11 (7) 
mtitit RRAR βα ˆˆ −−= , where t=-5, …, –1 (8) 
∑
−
−=
=
1
5t
iti ARCAR  (9) 
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where itR is return for stock i on day t, mtR is the NYSE equally-weighted index on day t, and itAR is the 
abnormal return for stock i on day t. We can observe from Table 1 that about 68% of issuing firms 
experience negative cumulative abnormal return during the five trading days prior to an offer. 
 
3.2.4 Measure of Rounding of Offer Price 
Corwin (2003) finds that underwriters tend to round off offer prices to even dollars or by $0.25 
increments. From 1996 to 1998, more than 40% of offers were priced at even dollars. He therefore assigns 
a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the decimal portion of the closing price is less than 0.25 and 0 if 
otherwise. However, it can be argued that this becomes a de facto consideration only when the ex post 
SEO is truly priced at a 0.25 increment. In the present study, Corwin’s (2003) approach was modified, and 
$0.25 was chosen as unit price increments, and the rounding dummy is 1 if the offer price ends with 0.00, 
0.25, 0.50, or 0.75 and, 0 if otherwise.2
 
 
4. Evidence of Short Sales’ Restrictions on Informed Trading 
4.1 Constraints on Short Sales and Change in Intraday volatility 
4.1.1 Evidence of Restriction on Informed Trading 
Many recent studies (e.g., Corwin 2003; Kim and Shin 2004) of SEOs take into account the 
significant impact of Rule 10b-21 on pricing. They contend that this rule not only prohibits manipulative 
trading, but also it unintentionally restricts informed traders from trading on bad private news. 3
The changes in intraday volatility around an SEO relative to the benchmark period are presented 
in Table 2. The results in Column (1) show that intraday volatility grows gradually during the five 
consecutive trading days prior to pricing and reaches its highest point on the day before an offer. On day 
  
According to this argument, price uncertainty increases prior to an offer.  
                                                        
2Although, since January 29, 2001, decimal pricing has been fully implemented on the NYSE, underwriters are still inclined to 
price at even eighth increments. In the present study’s sample, 33 of 69 offers are priced at even eighth increments. The proportion 
of the sample with an offer price ending with $0.00, $0.25, $0.50, and $0.75 are 18.8%, 5.8%, 15.9%, and 4.4%, respectively. 
3Note that informed trading does not refer to illegal insider trading; it refers to trading triggered by traders’ rational 
estimation of stock prices based on public information, such as annual earnings or media reports. 
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-5, the change in intraday volatility is 16.14%, while on day -1, the change increases to 40.79%. This 
increased price uncertainty reflects the cumulative effects of the restraints on informed trading.  
<Insert Table 2 here.> 
The proposition of constraints on informed trading is also supported by the finding that intraday 
volatility falls substantially after the offer day (on day 1, the change in price uncertainty relative to the 
benchmark period is about 26%, which is apparently much lower than the level on day -1 and 0) and 
continues to decline over the subsequent four trading days. The substantial decrease in information 
asymmetry after the offer date can be attributed to the subsequent relaxation of the limits on short sales 
and the resumption of informed trading. 
 
4.1.2 Asymmetric Influence on Informed Trading with Favorable and Unfavorable Private 
Information 
Constraints on short sales restrict the dissemination of unfavorable private information about 
stocks, but they should have little effect on informed traders trading with favorable information. Therefore, 
if the increase in price uncertainty is due to the Rule’s restraints on short sales, it is expected that for firms 
with favorable information the increase in uncertainty should be less significant. Altinkilic and Hansen’s 
(2003) method is employed to discriminate among informed traders with different information. Essentially, 
they use the five-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) immediately before pricing to identify the type 
of potential information. If the five-day CAR is positive (negative), a firm is classified as one with 
favorable (unfavorable) private information that is less (more) susceptible to short sales constraints. 
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 2 present the subsample results conditioned on the sign of the five-day CAR. 
There is less restriction on informed trading for firms with potential favorable information; therefore, 
increases in uncertainty prior to an offer should be lower, if at all. Column (2) in Table 2 shows that 
changes in uncertainty for firms with favorable private information are between 18.89% and 24.52%. 
However, for firms with unfavorable private information, as shown in column (3), increases in uncertainty 
are between 14.86% and 48.39%. Note that the cumulative increase in uncertainty on the day immediately 
before pricing is approximately 50% relative to the benchmark period. Furthermore, comparing the 
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increases in uncertainty for these two subsamples, we find that during the pre-pricing period, with each 
passing day, the increase in uncertainty for firms with unfavorable information becomes progressively 
higher than the increase for firms with favorable information. From day -5 to day -3, the differences 
between the two subsamples are not significant even at the 10% level; on day -2 and day -1, the 
differences widen gradually and become significant at the 5% level. Accordingly, the results presented in 
columns (2) and (3) in Table 2 indicate that the increase in uncertainty can, at least partly, be explained by 
the unintended restraints on informed trading on unfavorable private information.  
 
4.1.3 Asymmetric Influence on Informed Trading with Favorable and Unfavorable Private 
Information in the Presence of Options Listing 
Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) propose that even when there is a restriction on short sales 
informed traders still can trade on unfavorable information through the options market. Therefore, for a 
stock that is also listed on the options market, the increase in intraday volatility due to short sales 
constraints should be smaller than for stocks with no listings on the options market. In order to control for 
the effects of listings on the options market, the sample is divided into two subsamples. Column (4) 
presents the subsample results for firms with a positive five-day CAR or listed on the options market, and 
column (5) shows the subsample results for firms with a negative five-day CAR and not listed on the 
options market. As illustrated in column (5), after controlling for the substitutive effects of options listings, 
the cumulative effects of short sales constraints on firms that are more susceptible to short sales 
constraints become more significant. On day -1, the intraday volatility increases by 56.41%, which is 
significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, the p-value of the comparison test of the two subsamples reveals 
that during the three days immediately before pricing the increases in price uncertainty for stocks that are 
susceptible to short sales constraints are significantly larger than for stocks that are not susceptible to short 
sales constraints at less than the 10% level. This is especially so on day -1 when the differences of two 
subsamples are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. These results strongly support the 
hypothesis that the short sales constraints imposed by Rule 105 unintentionally restrict informed trading 
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triggered by traders’ rational estimation of firms’ future performance and inhibit the incorporation of 
unfavorable information into stock prices.  
 
4.2 Constraints on Short Sales and Divergence in Investors’ Opinions 
As shown in the previous section, short sales constraints inhibit the incorporation of unfavorable 
information into stock prices, leading to a lower information content of the prices. The cumulative effect 
of the short sales constraint contributes to the difficulty of interpreting the trading activities in the stock 
market and the expectation of true stock values become harder. Therefore, we expect that, for stocks that 
are susceptible to short sales constraints, the divergence in investors’ opinions will be greater.  
In this section, the difference of opinions is measured by unanticipated trading volume calculated 
by using equations (3) through (5). Table 3 presents the mean of unexpected trading volume around an 
offer. Column (1) of the table shows that, during the five trading days prior to an offer, the standardized 
unanticipated trading volume, which is a proxy for opinion divergence, grows gradually and are all 
significant at the 1% level. This indicates that as the offer day approaches investors’ opinion divergence 
becomes increasingly wider and reaches its highest level on the day immediately prior to the offer. 
<Insert Table 3 here.> 
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 3 report the mean unanticipated trading volume for firms with a 
positive and negative 5-day CAR, respectively, where a positive (negative) CAR indicates a smaller 
(larger) susceptibility to short sales constraints. The comparison test shows that, as an offer day 
approaches, the difference of opinion divergence between the two subsamples becomes more apparent. On 
day -2, the divergence between the two subsamples is different at the 10% level and, on day -1, it is 
different at the 1% level. Furthermore, after controlling for the substitutive effects of options as synthetic 
short sales, it can be observed that the difference of opinion divergence between the two subsamples 
becomes more obvious, as shown in columns (4) and (5) of Table 3. The p-value of the t-test shows that, 
on day -2, the opinion divergence differs at the 5% level; on day -1, it differs at the 1% level. We have 
shown from the evidence presented that short sales constraints inhibit informed trading of private 
unfavorable information and reduce the information content of stock prices. 
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4.3 Constraints on Short Sales and Market’ Asymmetric Sensitivity to Trading Directions 
4.3.1 Asymmetric Sensitivity to Different Trading Directions 
We check the robustness of our results on whether the increase in price uncertainty is the result of 
the restriction on informed trading of unfavorable information by examining market makers’ asymmetric 
sensitivity to different trading directions during the restricted period. If short sales constraints inhibit the 
incorporation of potential unfavorable information into stock prices, it is reasonable to expect that market 
will be more sensitive to seller-initiated trading during the restricted period than to buyer-initiated trades. 
Following Chae (2005), we measure market’s price sensitivity by regressing the change of transactions 
prices on the signed trading volume. However, in order to differentiate the market’s price sensitivity to a 
different trading direction, we include a dummy variable, TrDirection, in the following regression model. 
nTrDirectiomeSignedVolumeSignedVoluP *21 ββα ++=∆               (10) 
where P∆ is the change of transaction prices, SignedVolume is the product of trading volume and the 
trading sign inferred by the methods suggested by Lee and Ready (1991), TrDirection is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the trade is buyer-initiated and 0 if the trade is seller-initiated. 
A significant negative coefficient of the interaction term, 2β , indicates that market is more 
sensitive to seller-initiated trading, and a significant positive coefficient means that market is more 
sensitive to buyer-initiated trades. Market’s sensitivity to buyer-initiated trading, SEN_POS, is represented 
by the sum of 1β  and 2β , whereas their sensitivity to seller-initiated trading, SEN_NEG, is 1β . The 
extent of market’s asymmetric sensitivity, ASYM, can be measured by: 
NEGSENPOSSEN
NEGSENPOSSENASYM
__
__
+
−
=
                       
(11) 
The range of ASYM is between -1 and 1 because both SEN_POS and SEN_NEG are supposed to 
be non-negative4
                                                        
4 We winsorize SEN_NEG or SEN_POS to zero if they are negative. 
. A value of ASYM that is close to -1 indicates that market is more sensitive to 
seller-initiated trading and, a value closer to 1, more sensitive to buyer-initiated trading. When the value of 
ASYM is around 0, it implies that market tends to treat different trading directions equally. 
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Panel A of Table 4 shows the extent of market’s asymmetric sensitivity to different trading 
directions. Column (1) shows that market’s asymmetric sensitivity, ASYM, is mostly significantly below 0, 
and that the value of ASYM falls gradually during the restricted period: that is, market responds more to 
seller-initiated trading than to buyer-initiated trading during the restricted period, and this asymmetry 
becomes more pronounced as the offer day approaches. This result is consistent with the prediction that 
short sales constraints inhibit the incorporation of unfavorable information into the stock price, which 
results in market’s relatively more sensitive sensitivity to seller-initiated trading.  
<Insert Table 4 here.> 
A comparison of columns (2) and (3) of Panel A, Table 4, shows that market responds more to 
seller-initiated trading in both subsamples conditioned on the sign of the five-day CAR than to 
buyer-initiated trading. We observe a significant difference in asymmetric sensitivity between the two 
groups on day -2 and day -1 (p-values are 0.03 and 0.04, respectively). In order to control for the 
substitutive effects of listing on the options market, similar to the analysis of the increase in price 
uncertainty, a subsample is formed from stocks susceptible to short sales constraints that have a negative 
five-day CAR but are not listed on the options market. Column (4) shows that market’s asymmetric 
sensitivity is between -0.09 and -0.22 before the offer day, while column (5) shows that the asymmetric 
sensitivity is between -0.16 and -0.30, which is apparently lower than those in column (4). The 
comparison of the two subsamples shows that on days -4, -2, and -1, the differences between the two 
subgroups are significant at less than the 10% level, which suggests that market is more sensitive to 
seller-initiated trading for those firms that are susceptible to short sales constraints. This evidence further 
supports the hypothesis that unfavorable information is not reflected in stock prices when there are short 
sales constraints. 
 
4.3.2 Change in Asymmetric Response to Different Trading Directions 
In order to analyze the change of market’s response to seller-initiated trading more clearly, the 
change in asymmetric response, ΔASYM, is measured as the difference between ASYM and the median of 
ASYM during the benchmark period (i.e., from day -30 to -11): 
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Benchmarktt ASYMASYMASYM −=∆                      (12) 
The mean changes in asymmetric response for the whole sample and subsamples are listed in 
Panel B of Table 4. A positive (negative) change in asymmetric response indicates that market’s relatively 
higher sensitivity to seller-initiated trading becomes less (more) apparent relative to the benchmark period. 
Column (1) shows that for the whole sample the changes in asymmetric sensitivity are significant at the 
1% level from day -3 to day -1. Asymmetric sensitivity remains steady for stocks with a positive five-day 
CAR during the restricted period, as shown in Column (2). In contrast, the changes of asymmetric 
sensitivity are significantly below 0 at the 5% level for stocks with a negative CAR during the last two 
days of the restricted period. The result from the comparison test shows that, on day -4, the negative 
change in asymmetric sensitivity for firms with unfavorable information is significantly larger than for 
firms with favorable information.  
The negative change in asymmetric sensitivity becomes more pronounced when the effects of 
listing on the options market are considered relative to the benchmark period. Column (5) of Table 4 
shows that, for those stocks with a negative five-day CAR and not listed on the options market, the 
changes in asymmetric sensitivity are negative and significant on days -4 and -2 at the 5% level. However, 
for stocks with a positive five-day CAR or are listed on the options market (i.e., stocks that are not 
susceptible to short sales constraints), the asymmetric sensitivity does not change substantially. This 
evidence further demonstrates that, for those stocks that are more susceptible to short sales constraints, the 
market becomes much more sensitive to selling activities on the market relative to the benchmark period. 
The sharp negative changes in asymmetric sensitivity support the proposition that short sales constraints 
restrict the incorporation of unfavorable information into stock prices. 
 
4.4 Constraints on Short Sales and Informed Trading Prior to Pricing 
A direct way of estimating the effects of short sales constraints is to observe the change of 
informed transactions during the restricted period. With the TAQ database, it is not possible to 
differentiate between transactions that are motivated by information trading and those that are initiated by 
liquidity demand. Several studies (e.g., Cready, 1988; Cready and Mynatt, 1991; Lee, 1992) use trade 
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volume or trading value to distinguish between individual and institutional trades. Lee and Radhakrishna 
(2000) use a unique dataset (i.e., TORQ), which contains information about individual orders, to test the 
techniques used to identify institutional and individual orders. After comparing different strategies of 
classification, they classify trades of $5,000 or less as individual trades and trades of $50,000 or more as 
institutional trades, resulting in a very low probability of error. 
In the present study, the effects on trades triggered by investors’ rational estimation of future stock 
price are analyzed. It may be reasonable to assume that institutional investors tend to have more resources 
at their disposal for analyzing firms’ future performances compared to individual investors, and they 
should be more likely to initiate trades based on their rational estimation. Therefore, institutional orders 
are more likely to be information based. Using the three-tiered approach suggested by Lee and 
Radhakrishna (2000), all transactions are divided into three groups: information-based transactions (i.e., 
informed transactions), liquidity transaction (i.e., uninformed transactions), and transactions that are hard 
to identify. 
 
4.4.1 Change in Informed Transactions 
During the pre-pricing period, the options market may attract some informed transactions from the 
equity market. Previous studies (e.g., Amin and Lee, 1997; Cao, Chen, and Griffin, 2005) suggest that, 
around an information event, such as earnings or takeover announcements, informed traders are more 
likely to trade in the options market as it offers a high-leverage, more effective venue for informed trading. 
In order to remove the effects from the options market, stocks that have a listing in the options market are 
removed from the sample in the following sections, resulting in a new sample size of 142 issues.  
Panel A of Table 5 shows the change in informed transactions relative to the benchmark period. A 
transaction is deemed a potential informed trade if the dollar volume of the transaction is larger than 
$50,000. In column (1) of Panel A, we show that the number of informed transactions grows 
monotonically, at the 1% significance level, from day -5 to day -1. On the day immediately before pricing, 
the number of potential informed transactions rises by approximately 315% relative to the benchmark 
period. As predicted in the preceding analysis, due to short sales constraints, trading on unfavorable 
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information will be largely restricted. Therefore, if the hypothesis about the effects of short sales 
constraints holds, then changes in the number of informed transactions of stocks that are susceptible to 
short sales constraints should be lower than those of stocks that are not susceptible to the constraints.  
<Insert Table 5 here.> 
Columns (2) and (3) of Panel A, Table 5, present the changes in the number of informed 
transactions of subsamples conditioned on the sign of the five-day CAR. Contrary to our expectation, the 
comparison shows that changes in informed transactions for stocks that are susceptible to short sales 
constraints are not significantly lower than those for stocks that are not susceptible to the constraints 
during the last two trading days before an offer. However, this result may be due to the fact that, as an 
offer date approaches, stock market manipulators may have already begun to trade with their private 
information in order to distort the stock prices. Because it is impossible to differentiate manipulative 
transactions from the informed ones, we attempt to mitigate this problem by observing the change in 
uninformed transactions instead. 
 
4.4.2 Change in Uninformed Transactions 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Foster and Viswanathan (1990), and Chae (2005) suggest that if 
liquidity traders have timing discretion they will postpone their trading when they suspect the existence of 
informed trading. According to this argument, if informed transactions are restricted by short sales 
constraints, liquidity transactions will sharply increase. Panel B of Table 5 shows the change in liquidity 
transactions during the restricted period for the complete sample and subsamples. Column (2) of the panel 
reveals that liquidity trading only changes marginally during the restricted period for those stocks that are 
not susceptible to short sales constraints. However, for stocks that are susceptible to the constraints, the 
increase in liquidity trading is significant throughout the entire restricted period (see column (3)). In 
addition, the comparison test shows that, on day -1, the change in liquidity transactions of the subsamples 
differs significantly at the 1% level. The activity of liquidity traders further reflects the restriction on 
informed transactions imposed by short sales constraints. 
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5. SEO Discounting and Effect of Short Sales Constraints on Information Content of Stock Prices 
The empirical predictions of the main theories that explain the determinants of SEO discounting 
are summarized in Table 6.  
<Insert Table 6 here.> 
In order to estimate the determinants of SEO discounts, the following multivariate regression on 
various explanatory variables is conducted: 
εββββ
ββββ
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  (13)
 
where DISCOUNT, is defined as -1 times the return from the previous day’s closing transaction price to 
the offer price; VOLBenchmark is the median intraday volatility during the benchmark period (i.e., from day 
-30 to day -11); ΔVOL[-2,-1] is the median of the changes in intraday volatility over two trading days 
immediately before an offer relative to the median of intraday volatility during the benchmark period; 
SUV[-2,-1] is defined as the median unexpected trading volume in the two trading days immediately before 
an offer, i.e., days -2 and -1; ΔASYM[-2 ,-1] is change of asymmetric sensitivity over the two trading days 
immediately before an offer relative to the median asymmetric sensitivity during the benchmark period; 
CAR is the cumulative abnormal returns of the five trading days immediately prior to an offer; CAR_POS 
is equal to CAR if positive and 0, if otherwise; CARDUM is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if CAR is 
positive and 0, if otherwise; AMOUNT is the natural logarithm of the total dollar AMOUNT of an offer (in 
$ million); OFFSIZE is defined as a logarithm of the ratio of offered shares to total shares outstanding 
prior to the offer; BID_PRC equals the percentage difference between the closing bid and closing 
transaction price; and ROUNDING is a dummy variable that equals 1 if an offer is priced at $0.25 
increments and 0, if otherwise. 
<Insert Table 7 here.> 
The results of equation (13) are presented in Table 7. The relations between SEO discounts and 
cumulative effects of short sales constraints on the information content of stock prices are shown in 
Columns (1) to (3) of the table. Column (1) shows that the SEO discount is positively related to price 
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uncertainty during the benchmark period, VOLBenchmark, and to the change in price uncertainty, ΔVOL[-2, -1]. 
The former supports the hypothesis of uncertainty and asymmetric information, while the latter reveals 
that the increase of price uncertainty due to the constraints on informed trading before an offer enlarges 
the discount of the offer.  
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 7 present the univariate tests of the other two variables used to 
measure the effects of short sales constraints on information content of stock price and information 
environment: SUV[-2, -1], which measures the opinion divergence, and ΔASYM[-2, -1], which measures the 
change of market’s asymmetric sensitivity to different trading directions. The results show that, consistent 
with the prediction in Table 6, the coefficient of SUV[-2, -1] is positive and significant at the 1% level and 
that the coefficient of ΔASYM[-2, -1] is negative and significant at the 10% level. 
Furthermore, when we incorporate all of the three measures of cumulative effects of short sales 
constraints, as shown in Column (4), we find that the signs of the coefficients of all three variables are 
consistent with our predictions. The results are robust after controlling for other potential determinants of 
SEO discounts, such as CAR, CARDUM, BID_PRC, and ROUNDING. This result reveals that the 
exacerbation of information environment and the subsequent reduction in information content of stock 
price due to short sales constraints during the pre-pricing period are among the main reasons of SEO 
discounting. The results of the multivariate regression do not support the theories surrounding the 
hypothesis of discounts advanced by Corwin (2003) that some offers are priced at the closing bid as our 
results show that the coefficient of BID_PRC is not significant even at the 10% level.  
The rent expropriation theory advanced by Loughran and Ritter (2002) predicts that underwriters 
expropriate profits from firms with good news. In other words, the magnitude of discounts is positively 
related to positive cumulative abnormal returns (CAR_POS). However, the results of the models in Table 7 
argue against this prediction, with a negative and insignificant correlation between SEO discounting and 
CAR_POS. This evidence is contrary to the rent expropriation hypothesis. In addition, Models (5) and (6) 
show that the coefficient on ROUNDING is positively significant at the 1% level, supporting Mola and 
Loughran’s (2004) hypothesis of offer price rounding. 
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The results of this study do not show any relationship between discounting and either measure of 
price pressure (i.e., AMOUNT and OFFSIZE). However, further analysis of the correlation between the 
change in uncertainty and the relative offer size shows that they are positively and significantly correlated 
at approximately the 10% level. This means that the effects of the relative offer size may be captured by 
ΔVOL[-2, -1]. According to Myers and Majluf (1984), if there is information asymmetry between managers 
and investors, firms only issue equity when their stock is overpriced. Following this line of reasoning, a 
relatively larger offer size tends to increase the uncertainty of the stock price. Therefore, underwriters 
should compensate investors for the additional risk they face in buying the offered shares. This evidence 
supports the temporary price pressure hypothesis. 
 
6. Downward Adjustment of Stock Price On Offer Day 
The results of the robustness test in section 4 indicate that, on an offer day, after the constraints on 
informed trading are relaxed, informed traders resume their informed trading and incorporate their private 
information into the stock price. The first-day return reflects investors’ adjustment of stock prices based on 
their rational estimation. If unfavorable private information is not released prior to an offer, the stock is 
most likely overpriced. Therefore, the downward adjustments of the estimated value for stocks with a 
higher increase in potential unfavorable information will be larger than for other stocks. The empirical 
results shown in Table 8 support this proposition. 
<Insert Table 8 here.> 
Panels A and B of Table 8 show that the downside adjustment of stock prices on the offer day for 
stocks with favorable private information is significantly smaller than for stocks with unfavorable 
information. For stocks with potentially unfavorable information, the closing prices on the offer day are 
downward adjusted by about 0.50%, which is significant at the 5% level according to the sign test, while 
for stocks with potentially favorable information, the closing prices on the offer day grow by 0.30% 
relative to the closing price of day -1. Furthermore, the t-test and Wilcoxon test of equality between the 
two samples show that the differences in the adjustment of stock prices are significant at less than the 5% 
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level. In order to further check for the effects of short sales constraints on stock prices, the following 
regression is performed: 
εββββ
βββ
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_
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 (14) 
The dependent variable in equation (14) is the first day’s return, which is defined as the return from the 
previous day’s closing transaction price to offer day’s closing transaction price. Four variables are 
included in the regression as proxies for the effects of short sales constraints. First, ΔVOLF is the change in 
intraday volatility on an offer day relative to the median intraday volatility during the two trading days 
immediately preceding the offer (i.e., days -2 and–1). It is expected that the larger the decrease in intraday 
volatility on the offer day, the larger would be the downward adjustment of stock price, i.e., ΔVOLF is 
expected to be positively correlated with the first-day return. Second, SUV[-2, -1] is the standardized 
unexpected trading volume over the two trading days before an offer. Larger values of SUV[-2, -1] would 
indicate a higher potential of being overpriced. Therefore, we expect that higher values of SUV[-2, -1] would 
lead to lower first-day returns. Third, CARDUM is a dummy variable that captures the sign of the five-day 
CAR; it is equal to 1 if CAR > 0 and equal to 0 if CAR ≤  0. We expect that firms with unfavorable 
information will experience a larger downward adjustment in their stock price on the offer day, i.e., the 
coefficient of CARDUM is expected to be positive. Fourth, we include CAR in the model to measure the 
potential existence of unfavorable private information because the higher the CAR is, the less likely that 
the private information is unfavorable. Thus, the sign of the coefficient of CAR is expected to be positive. 
Two control variables that may affect the adjustment of stock prices on the first day are included 
in the regression shown in equation (14). The first, SURPRISE, captures the element of surprise in the 
discounting of the SEO on the first trading day and is measured by the residual of model 5 (Table 7).5
                                                        
5
 
 It 
represents the discount beyond investors’ aggregate expectation. As confirmed by Altinkilic and Hansen 
(2003), offer prices convey information that may alter the estimation of investors, and a major component 
of that information is the discounting surprise. The larger the unanticipated discount, the more investors 
εββββββ ++−−∆+−−+−−∆++= ROUNDINGASYMSUVVOLVOLDISCOUNT 1043210 1]2,[1]2,[1] 2,[benchmark
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will adjust their estimation downward. In addition, because part of the information contained in 
unanticipated discounts had already been acquired by some investors and should already have been 
incorporated into the closing price on day -1, the coefficient of SURPRISE is predicted to be higher than 
-1 but still negative. The second control variable is the market return, MKT_RETURN, as measured by the 
NYSE equally-weighted index on the offer day, reflecting the market movement on the offer day. 
The regression results of the determinants of offer-day adjustments are presented in Panel C of 
Table 8. These results show a significantly negative relationship between the first-day return and the 
degree of discounting surprise. The coefficient of SURPRISE, which is less than -0.64 and significant at 
the 1% level, confirms that stock price adjustments, to a large extent, reflect the information contained in 
the offer price. The coefficient of MKT_RETURN is positive and significant at the 5% level, which 
indicates that first-day returns move contemporaneously with the market.  
The positive correlation between the dummy variable, CARDUM, and stock price adjustment 
supports the hypothesis that for stocks that are less susceptible to short sales constraints (i.e., when 
CARDUM equals 1) there is less obvious downward adjustment of stock prices on the offer day. The 
positive coefficient of CAR provides further evidence that stocks that are susceptible to short sales 
constraints are more likely to be overpriced. Furthermore, the positive coefficient of ΔVOLF and negative 
coefficient of SUV[-2, -1] in models (3) and (4) also indicate that the constraints on informed trading of 
unfavorable information cause stocks to be overpriced. 
 
7. Conclusion  
Prior to SEC’s adoption of Rule 10b-21, the popular belief was that some investors could 
manipulate the stock price through short selling during the pre-pricing period. Market participants 
assumed that informed investors with favorable private information on the issuers would trade contrary to 
their private information to drive the market price down. Because the prices of new offers are typically 
based on the closing price prior to the pricing, such a manipulative conduct distorts the market price for 
the security, inhibiting the stock market from functioning as an independent pricing mechanism and 
eroding the fairness of offer price. In order to avoid such manipulative trading, National Association of 
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Securities Dealers (NASD) adopted Rule 10b-21 and Rule 105 successively, trying to prohibit the 
potential manipulative conducts by effecting short sales prior to pricing to profit from buying new shares 
at lower offer price.  
Previous studies have suggested that the constraints on short sales over the restricted period before 
pricing restrict the information-based short sales and thus increase the information asymmetry between 
informed and uninformed traders. However, none of them provided explicit evidence to support their 
suppositions. The study discussed in this article examines the change in information content of stock price 
around an SEO offer day and reveals that, for those offers with hidden adverse information, the constraints 
on short sales inhibit the incorporation of unfavorable information and cause a substantial increase in price 
uncertainty, lead to divergence in investors’ opinion and result in market’s relatively more sensitive 
response to seller-initiated trading. The evidence presented supports the proposition that the constraints of 
the SEC’s Rule 105 reduce information content of stock price before an SEO offer.  
Multivariate analysis suggests that, after controlling for other possible contributors for a value 
discount on an offer day, such as price pressure and rounding of SEO pricing, the decrease in information 
content of stock price due to Rule 105 significantly affects the pricing of SEOs. Due to the restraints of the 
Rule on informed trading based on bad news, stocks with private unfavorable information are more likely 
to be overpriced. Therefore, investors readjust their estimation of stock values according to the 
information released on the pricing day. The downward correction of value estimation causes the first-day 
returns of stocks with unfavorable private news to be larger than the first-day returns of stocks with 
favorable news.
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics for Seasoned Offers 
 
This table lists summary statistics for 201 seasoned offers issued on NYSE from April 1998 to September 2002. 
Discount is defined as -1 times the return from the previous day’s closing transaction price to the offer price. 
VOLBenchmark is the median of intraday volatility in the benchmark period (i.e. from day -30 to day -11). VOL[-2, -1] is 
the median of intraday volatility of two trading days immediately before an offer (i.e. from day -2 to day -1). 
ΔVOL[-2, -1] is the change in intraday volatility over two trading days immediately before an offer relative to the 
median of intraday volatility in the benchmark period (i.e., from day -30 to day -11). SUV[-2,-1] is defined as the 
median of standardized unexpected trading volume of two trading days immediately before an offer (i.e. day -2 and 
day -1). CAR is the cumulative abnormal return of five trading days prior to an offer. AMOUNT is a logarithm of 
total dollar amount of offer (in $ million). OFFSIZE is defined as a logarithm of the ratio of offered shares to total 
shares outstanding prior to the offer. 
 
Variables Mean Median P90 Skewness t-stat p-value 
Percent 
Positive 
Percent 
Zero 
Discount 2.0790 1.3956 5.3584 1.1671 10.0902 <0.0001 81% 8.5% 
VOLBenchmark 1.9877 1.7961 3.0119 1.8684 34.7663 <0.0001 - - 
VOL[-2, -1] 2.5592 2.1995 3.9868 2.9801 24.6173 <0.0001 - - 
ΔVOL[-2, -1] 0.3247 0.2085 0.9787 2.7714 7.5664 <0.0001 69% - 
SUV[-2,-1] 2.1287 1.2415 5.6416 4.9691 8.1566 <0.0001 83% - 
CAR -3.2011 -3.0652 5.3005 -0.4918 -6.2695 <0.0001 32% - 
AMOUNT ($ mil) 254.78 153.95 553.30 5.4906 9.4970 <0.0001 - - 
OFFSIZE -2.5092 -2.3511 -1.4788 -0.4750 -30.1794 <0.0001 - - 
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Table 2 
Change in Intraday volatility 
 
This table presents the mean of the change in intraday volatility around a new offer. Relative intraday volatility is the 
change in intraday volatility relative to the median of intraday volatility in the benchmark period, which is five 
trading days ending two weeks before an offer (i.e., from day -30 to day -11). CAR, which is used to divide the 
whole sample into subsamples, is the cumulative abnormal return of five trading days prior to an offer. The values in 
parentheses are the p-values of the t-test. 
 
 Change in Intraday volatility 
 All Seasoned Offers with  Seasoned Offers with  
Relative 
Day (n = 201) 
Positive 
five-day 
CAR 
(n = 64) 
Negative 
five-day 
CAR 
(n = 137) 
t-test 
(p_value) 
Positive 
five-day CAR 
or with Option 
Listing 
(n = 98) 
Negative five-day 
CAR and without 
Option Listing 
(n = 103) 
t-test 
(p_value) 
 (1) (2) (3) (2) = (3) (4) (5) (4) = (5) 
-5 0.1614*** 0.1889*** 0.1486*** (0.6112) 0.1532*** 0.1693*** (0.8267) 
-4 0.1766*** 0.1883*** 0.1711*** (0.8275) 0.1359*** 0.2154*** (0.2771) 
-3 0.2168*** 0.1724** 0.2376*** (0.4474) 0.1424*** 0.2877*** (0.0752)* 
-2 0.2416*** 0.1248** 0.2961*** (0.0313)** 0.1476*** 0.3310*** (0.0354)** 
-1 0.4079*** 0.2452*** 0.4839*** (0.0125)** 0.2437*** 0.5641*** (0.0013)*** 
0 0.3991*** 0.2529*** 0.4674*** (0.0485)** 0.2145*** 0.5747*** (0.0005)*** 
1 0.2587*** 0.1689** 0.3006*** (0.1932) 0.1645*** 0.3482*** (0.0582)* 
2 0.1976*** 0.1320* 0.2282*** (0.2638) 0.1354*** 0.2567*** (0.1337) 
3 0.1778*** 0.0743 0.2261*** (0.0481)** 0.1161** 0.2365*** (0.1018) 
4 0.2287*** 0.1338 0.2730*** (0.1517) 0.1314** 0.3213*** (0.0315)** 
5 0.1830*** 0.0496 0.2453*** (0.0092)*** 0.1732*** 0.2717** (0.4526) 
 
*Significant at the 10% level 
**Significant at the 5% level 
***Significant at the 1% level  
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Table 3 
Standardized Unexpected Trading Volume 
 
This table presents the mean of standardized unexpected trading volume around a new offer. Standardized 
unexpected trading volume is calculated using a methodology that is similar to the market model approach. 
itititit RRVolume εββα +++=
−+ ||ˆ||ˆˆ 21 , where t = –120, …, –11 
−+ −−−= ||ˆ||ˆˆ 21 itititit RRVolumeUVolume ββα , where t=-5,…,5 
ititit SUVolumeSUV /=  
where itVolume  is number of shares traded for stock i at date t. 
+|| itR and 
−|| itR denote absolute value of positive 
daily return and absolute value of negative daily return for stock i at date t, respectively. itS is the standard deviation 
of itε in model (3).  
CAR, which is used to divide the whole sample into subsamples, is the cumulative abnormal return of five trading 
days prior to an offer. The values in parentheses are the p-values of the t-test. 
 
 
 Standardized Unexpected Trading Volume 
 All Seasoned Offers with  Seasoned Offers with  
Relative 
Day (n = 201) 
Positive 
five-day 
CAR 
(n = 64) 
Negative 
five-day 
CAR 
(n = 137) 
t-test 
(p_value) 
Positive 
five-day 
CAR or 
with Option 
Listing 
(n = 98) 
Negative 
five-day CAR 
and without 
Option Listing 
(n = 103) 
t-test 
(p_value) 
 (1) (2) (3) (2) = (3) (4) (5) (4) = (5) 
-5 0.3561*** 0.3772* 0.3462*** (0.8929) 0.2894** 0.4195*** (0.5138) 
-4 1.0489** 1.3710 0.8984* (0.6404) 0.9350 1.1573* (0.7984) 
-3 0.9690*** 0.9344*** 0.9852*** (0.8645) 0.7400*** 1.1869*** (0.1277) 
-2 1.4017*** 0.9005*** 1.6359*** (0.0751)* 0.8929*** 1.8859*** (0.0390)** 
-1 2.8556*** 1.6353*** 3.4257*** (0.0017)*** 1.9314*** 3.7349*** (0.0081)*** 
0 48.0879*** 37.5363*** 53.0171*** (0.1103) 32.9004*** 62.5381*** (0.0069)*** 
1 8.0659*** 5.2499*** 9.3814*** (0.0091)*** 5.5435*** 10.4659*** (0.0114)** 
2 4.1087*** 3.1267*** 4.5675*** (0.0759)* 2.9939*** 5.1694*** (0.0213)** 
3 3.9508*** 2.8103*** 4.4836*** (0.0591) 2.7993*** 5.0465*** (0.0323)** 
4 3.3027*** 2.4013*** 3.7238*** (0.0904)* 2.2279*** 4.3254*** (0.0260)** 
5 2.7570*** 1.7561*** 3.2245*** (0.0723)* 1.1530*** 6.4046 (0.0265)** 
 
*Significant at the 10% level 
**Significant at the 5% level 
***Significant at the 1% level  
 
  33 
Table 4 
Asymmetric Sensitivity to Different Trading Directions 
 
Panel A lists the mean of the asymmetric sensitivity (ASYM) to different trading directions around a new offer. 
ASYM is the ratio of the difference between market’s sensitivity to buyer-initiated trading, SEN_POS, and 
seller-initiated trading, SEN_NEG, and a total of these two sensitivities. We estimate SEN_POS and SEN_NEG by 
regressing the following model: tttt nTrDirectiomeSignedVolumeSignedVoluP *** 21 ββα ++=∆  where P∆ is 
the change of transaction prices, SignedVolume is the product of trading volume and the trading sign inferred by the 
methods suggested by Lee and Ready (1991), TrDirection is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the trade is 
buyer-initiated and 0 if the trade is seller-initiated. SEN_POS is equal to β1+β2 and SEN_NEG is equal toβ1. Panel B 
lists the mean of the change of asymmetric sensitivity to different trading directions around a new offer. Change of 
asymmetric sensitivity is the difference between the asymmetric sensitivity and the median of the asymmetric 
sensitivity over the benchmark period, which is five trading days ending two weeks before an offer (i.e., from day 
-30 to day –11). CAR, which is used to divide the whole sample into subsamples, is the cumulative abnormal return 
of five trading days prior to an offer. The values in parentheses are the p-values of the t-test. 
 
Panel A: Asymmetric Sensitivity to Different Trading Directions 
 All Seasoned Offers with  Seasoned Offers with  
Relative 
Day (n = 201) 
Positive 
five-day 
CAR 
(n = 64) 
Negative 
five-day 
CAR 
(n = 137) 
t-test 
(p_value) 
Positive 
five-day CAR 
or with Option 
Listing 
(n = 98) 
Negative 
five-day CAR 
and without 
Option Listing 
(n = 103) 
t-test 
(p_value) 
 (1) (2) (3) (2) = (3) (4) (5) (4) = (5) 
-5 -0.1536*** -0.1767*** -0.1427*** (0.6163) -0.1432*** -0.1634*** (0.7476) 
-4 -0.1772*** -0.0641 -0.2300*** (0.0168)** -0.0930** -0.2573*** (0.0132)** 
-3 -0.2162*** -0.2471*** -0.2017*** (0.4681) -0.2206*** -0.2119*** (0.8839) 
-2 -0.2205*** -0.1165** -0.2691*** (0.0256)** -0.1383*** -0.2988*** (0.0095)*** 
-1 -0.2184*** -0.1335** -0.2580*** (0.0428)** -0.1613*** -0.2727*** (0.0504)* 
0 0.1627*** 0.1374*** 0.1746*** (0.5386) 0.1399*** 0.1844*** (0.4217) 
1 0.1132*** 0.1285*** 0.1060*** (0.7058) 0.1551*** 0.0733* (0.1466) 
2 0.0073 0.0341 -0.0053 (0.5921) -0.0085 0.0222 (0.6401) 
3 0.0214 0.0782 -0.0051 (0.2087) 0.0367 0.0069 (0.6266) 
4 -0.0193 -0.0025 -0.0272 (0.7176) -0.0026 -0.0352 (0.6146) 
5 -0.0307 -0.0244 -0.0336 (0.9014) -0.0191 -0.1351 (0.3135) 
Panel B: Change of Asymmetric Sensitivity to Different Trading Directions 
-5 -0.0480 -0.1008 -0.0233 (0.2869) -0.0531 -0.0431 (0.8790) 
-4 -0.0716** 0.0119 -0.1106** (0.0819)* -0.0029 -0.1370** (0.0487)** 
-3 -0.1106*** -0.1711*** -0.0823* (0.1984) -0.1305*** -0.0917* (0.5594) 
-2 -0.1150*** -0.0405 -0.1497*** (0.1269) -0.0482 -0.1785*** (0.0498)** 
-1 -0.1128*** -0.0575 -0.1386*** (0.1879) -0.0712* -0.1524*** (0.1765) 
0 0.2683*** 0.2133*** 0.2939*** (0.2265) 0.2300*** 0.3047*** (0.2184) 
1 0.2187*** 0.2045*** 0.2254*** (0.7307) 0.2452*** 0.1935*** (0.3630) 
2 0.1128*** 0.1101* 0.1141*** (0.9581) 0.0817* 0.1425*** (0.3538) 
3 0.1270*** 0.1542*** 0.1143*** (0.5571) 0.1268*** 0.1272*** (0.9956) 
4 0.0862** 0.0735 0.0922** (0.7933) 0.0875* 0.0850* (0.9716) 
5 0.0749* 0.0516 0.0858* (0.6804) 0.0902** -0.0639 (0.2702) 
 
*Significant at the 10% level 
**Significant at the 5% level 
***Significant at the 1% level    
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Table 5 
Change in Informed Transactions and Liquidity Transactions 
 
Panel A shows the change in informed transactions around a new offer. Transactions with a dollar volume larger than 
$50,000 are considered informed transactions. The change in informed transactions is computed relative to the 
median number of informed transactions over the benchmark period, which is five trading days ending two weeks 
before an offer (i.e., from day -30 to day –11). Panel B lists the cumulative change in informed transactions around a 
new offer. Cumulative change in informed transactions is the total change in informed transactions from previous 
trading days. Panel C lists the change in liquidity transactions around a new offer. Transactions with a dollar volume 
lower than $5,000 are considered liquidity transactions. Change in liquidity transactions is the change in liquidity 
transactions relative to the median of the number of liquidity transactions over the benchmark period, which is five 
trading days ending two weeks before an offer (i.e., from day -30 to day –11). CAR, which is used to divide the 
whole sample into subsamples, is the cumulative abnormal return of five trading days prior to an offer. The values in 
parentheses are the p-values of the t-test. 
 
Panel A: Change in Informed Transactions 
 All Seasoned Offers without Option Listing and  
Relative Day (n = 142) with Positive five-day CAR (n = 103) 
with Negative five-day CAR 
(n = 39) 
t-test 
(p_value) 
 (1) (2) (3) (2) = (3) 
-5 0.3905*** 0.5990** 0.4392*** (0.5834) 
-4 0.6463*** 1.0253*** 0.7811*** (0.5060) 
-3 1.2139*** 1.4343*** 1.5888*** (0.7493) 
-2 1.4740*** 1.3426*** 2.0054*** (0.2145) 
-1 3.1509*** 3.1792*** 4.1036*** (0.4071) 
0 30.7828*** 35.5858*** 42.2607*** (0.5309) 
1 7.1466*** 7.5112*** 9.4559*** (0.4789) 
2 4.0716*** 3.4157*** 5.8847*** (0.1072) 
3 3.5108*** 3.7055*** 4.7779*** (0.4758) 
4 2.8504*** 3.1005*** 3.8010*** (0.4004) 
5 2.5470*** 2.0165*** 3.7093*** (0.1192) 
Panel B: Change in Liquidity Transactions 
-5 0.1584*** 0.0822 0.1898** (0.3797) 
-4 0.1875*** 0.1762** 0.2089** (0.7774) 
-3 0.2128*** 0.1733* 0.2668*** (0.4488) 
-2 0.2994*** 0.2804 0.4681*** (0.3346) 
-1 0.3539*** 0.1389 0.6151*** (0.0011)*** 
0 1.3711*** 1.0297*** 2.0751*** (0.0039)*** 
1 1.0901*** 1.0174*** 1.5935*** (0.1124) 
2 0.7916*** 0.6216*** 1.2103*** (0.0290)** 
3 0.6882*** 0.3906*** 1.0779*** (0.0020) 
4 0.6557*** 0.5352*** 0.9833*** (0.0598)* 
5 0.5200*** 0.3469** 0.8112*** (0.0131)** 
 
*Significant at the 10% level 
**Significant at the 5% level 
***Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 6 
Summary of Empirical Predictions Related to SEO Discounting 
 
This table summarizes the directions of expected empirical relationships between the hypothesized explanatory 
variables and SEO discounting. The hypotheses are discussed in section 2. Discounting is defined as -1 times the 
return from the previous day’s closing transaction price to the offer price. VOLBenchmark is the median of intraday 
volatility in the benchmark period (i.e. from day -30 to day -11). ΔVOL[-2, -1] is the change in average intraday 
volatility over two trading days immediately before an offer relative to the median of intraday volatility during the 
benchmark period (i.e., from day -30 to day –11). SUV[-2,-1] is defined as the median of standardized unexpected 
trading volume of two trading days immediately before an offer (i.e. day -2 and day -1). ΔASYM[-2,-1] is change of 
asymmetric sensitivity over the two trading days immediately before an offer relative to the median of asymmetric 
sensitivity in the benchmark period (i.e., from day -30 to day –11). CAR is cumulative abnormal return of five 
trading days prior to an offer. CAR_POS is equal to CAR if positive and 0 if otherwise. AMOUNT is a logarithm of 
total dollar AMOUNT of offer (in $ million). OFFSIZE is defined as the ratio of offered shares to total shares 
outstanding prior to an offer. Rounding is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the offer is priced at $0.25 increments 
and 0 if otherwise. BID_PRC equals to percentage difference between closing price and closing bid.  
 
 
 
 Explanatory Variables and Predicted Relations 
Hypothesis VOLBenchmark ΔVOL[-2,-1] SUV[-2,-1] ΔASYM[-2,-1] AMOUNT OFFSIZE CAR Rounding BID_PRC 
Uncertainty/ 
Information 
Asymmetry 
(+)         
Price Pressure     (+) (+)    
Restraints on 
Informed 
Trading 
 (+) (+) (–)      
Offer Price 
Rounding        (+)  
Pricing at the 
Bid         (+) 
Rent 
Expropriation       
(+) 
CAR_POS   
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Table 7 
Determinants of SEO Discounting 
 
This Table lists coefficients (p-value) from regressions of discounting on firm and offer characteristics. The 
regression model is 
εββββ
ββββ
ββββ
+++++
+++∆+
+∆++=
−−
−−−−
ROUNDINGPRCBIDCARDUMPOSCAR
CAROFFSIZEAMOUNTASYM
SUVVOLVOLDISCOUNT Benchmark
*_**_*
****
***
10998
765]1,2[4
]1,2[3]1,2[210
 
The dependent variable, DISCOUNT, is defined as -1 times the return from the previous day’s closing transaction 
price to the offer price. VOLBenchmark is the median of intraday volatility in the benchmark period (i.e. from day -30 to 
day -11). ΔVOL[-2,-1] is the change in intraday volatility over two trading days immediately before an offer relative to 
the median of intraday volatility during the benchmark period. SUV[-2,-1] is defined as the median of unexpected 
trading volume of two trading days immediately before an offer (i.e. day -2 and day -1). ΔASYM[-2,-1] is change of 
asymmetric sensitivity over the two trading days immediately before an offer relative to the median of asymmetric 
sensitivity in the benchmark period (i.e., from day -30 to day –11). CAR is the cumulative abnormal return of five 
trading days prior to an offer. CAR_POS is equal to CAR if positive and 0 if otherwise. CARDUM is a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 if CAR is positive and 0 if otherwise. AMOUNT is a logarithm of total dollar AMOUNT of 
offer (in $ million). OFFSIZE is defined as offered shares divided by total shares outstanding prior to an offer. 
BID_PRC equals to percentage difference between closing bid and closing transaction price. ROUNDING is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if an offer is priced at $0.25 increments and 0 if otherwise. 
 
 
(1) 
(n = 201) 
(2) 
(n = 201) 
(3) 
(n = 201) 
(4) 
(n = 201) 
(5) 
(n = 201) 
(6) 
(n = 201) 
(7) 
(n = 201) 
(8) 
(n = 134) 
Intercept -1.0222* 1.6523*** 1.9688*** -1.2703** -2.0215*** -2.0731*** -1.3466** -2.1821 
VOLBenchmark 1.3566*** - - 1.3705*** 1.3197*** 1.2629*** 1.3797*** 1.4515*** 
ΔVOL[-2,-1] 1.3573*** - - 0.8787** 0.8876** 0.7631* 0.8940** 1.0120* 
SUV[-2,-1] - 0.2021*** - 0.1226* 0.1136* 0.1193* 0.1238* 0.0947 
ΔASYM[-2,-1] - - -0.9651* -1.0273* -0.9476* -0.8637 -1.0528* -0.9717 
AMOUNT - - - - - - - 0.0603 
OFFSIZE - - - - - - - 0.1307 
CAR - - - - - 0.0036 - - 
CAR_POS - - - - - -0.0005 - - 
CARDUM - - - - - - 0.1475 - 
BID_PRC - - - - - 0.6371 - - 
ROUNDING - - - - 1.1335** 1.1851*** - 1.1352** 
Adj._R-square 0.1625 0.0623 0.0088 0.1882 0.2113 0.2111 0.1845 0.2369 
F-stat 20.11 14.08 2.74 12.42 11.55 9.79 6.84 6.90 
 
*Significant at the 10% level 
**Significant at the 5% level 
***Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 8 
Adjustment of Estimation of Stock Prices on the Offer Day 
 
Panel A list the summary statistics of first-day return for two subsamples conditioned on the sign of five-day CAR. 
Panel B shows the result of testing the equality of first-day returns between two subsamples. Panel C is the 
regression of first-day returns against surprise discounting and constraints on informed trading. The regression model 
is as follows:  
εβββ
ββββ
++++
++∆+=− −−
RETURNMKTSURPRISECAR
CARDUMSUVVOLreturnDayFirst F
_***
***_
543
2]1,2[210
 
The dependent variable, First-Day return is the return from the previous day’s closing transaction price to offer day’s 
closing transaction price. SUV[-2,-1] is defined as the median of unexpected trading volume of two trading days 
immediately before an offer (i.e. day -2 and day -1). CAR is the cumulative abnormal return of five trading days 
prior to an offer. CARDUM is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if CAR is positive and 0 if otherwise. Surprise is 
the residual of model (5) in Table 7. ΔVOLF is the change of intraday volatility on an offer day relative to the median 
of intraday volatility over two trading days immediately before an offer. MKT_RETURN is the return on the CRSP 
equal-weighted index on offer day. The values in parentheses are the p-values of the coefficients. 
 
Panel A: First-day returns between the subsamples where CAR>0 and CAR≤0 
 N Mean Median Standard Deviation 
p-value 
(t test) 
p-value 
(sign test) 
Full Sample 201 0.3655 -0.3202 5.0051 0.3017 0.1746 
CAR>0 64 1.5305 0.2987 4.5297 0.0088*** 0.6147 
CAR≤0 137 -0.1790 -0.4975 5.1379 0.6847 0.0370** 
Panel B: Tests of equality of first-day returns between the subsamples where CAR>0 and CAR≤0  
 p-value 
Test of Equality (t test) 0.0184** 
Test of Equality (Wilcoxon) 0.0085*** 
Test of Equality (Median) 0.0596* 
Panel C: Regression of first-day return 
 Full sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
INTERCEPT 0.0229 0.9728*** -0.2356 0.8472** 
ΔVOLF - - 1.8781*** - 
SUV[-2,-1] - - - -0.1545* 
CARDUM 1.5385** - 1.6322** - 
CAR - 0.1474*** - - 
SURPRISE -0.6416*** -0.6418*** -0.7012*** -0.6417*** 
MKT_RETURN 0.5798** 0.5412** 0.6271*** 0.5313** 
Adj. R-square 0.1665 0.1924 0.2080 0.1579 
F-stat 14.12 16.64 13.94 13.31 
 
*Significant at the 10% level 
**Significant at the 5% level 
***Significant at the 1% level 
